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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE NEW AFSJ
PROVISIONS OF THE LISBON TREATY
The Lisbon Treaty has brought all provisions concerning
freedom, security and justice within the normal treaty
structure. As a consequence, the jurisdiction of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) extends to all EU law
including AFSJ. The preliminary rulings procedure has
been adapted to the needs of AFSJ (Arts 267 and 276
TFEU) with exceptions for reviewing police and other law-
enforcement services and safeguarding internal security.
For criminal cases an urgent preliminary procedure was
introduced.
The new version of the infringement procedure (Arts
259 and 260 TFEU) according to which the Commission
– in a case where a Member State has failed to notify
measures transposing a Directive under a legislative
procedure – can already in a first instance propose the EU
Court to impose a lump sum or a penalty payment on the
Member State concerned. This new version can contribute
to a better and timely implementation of EU law
obligations.
The Lisbon Treaty made significant changes to the EU’s
architecture by removing the Third Pillar and replacing it
by AFSJ, which means that the European Community rules
apply to the AFSJ as well. We consider this as the
“communitarisation” of the AFSJ. The consequence from
this will be more transparency, more efficiency and more
similarity with the legal effect (primacy, direct effect) of the
rule of law in the internal market.
The provisions of the AFSJ are included in Articles 67-
89 TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) in the
following five chapters:
Chapter 1 General provisions;
Chapter 2 Policies on border checks, asylum and immigra-
tion;
Chapter 3 Judicial cooperation in civil matters;
Chapter 4 Judicial cooperation in criminal matters; and
Chapter 5 Police cooperation areas.
The EU’s objectives as contained in Article 3 TEU
(Treaty on European Union) of the Lisbon Treaty are
renewed and hold the following provisions:
“2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom,
security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the
free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with
appropriate measures with respect to external border controls,
asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of
crime.
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3. The Union shall establish an internal market. […]”.
In Article 3 TEU the AFSJ has “moved up” the list, and
is now placed before the internal market. This shows the
interest and importance this area has attracted.
The AFSJ is further deemed to be an area, like the
internal market, that falls within shared competence.
However in Article 2(2) TFEU: “Shared competence
between the Union and the Member States” the internal
market (a) is higher on the list than the area of freedom,
security and justice (j).
Why in areas of power sharing is the AFSJ placed behind
the internal market? Is power sharing for the AFSJ less
important? The answer might be that the Union powers are
limited and not always clear as regards the many opt outs
and opt ins. The exact powers are not always easy to find as
there are many treaties on judicial cooperation which are
also outdated. The nature of power sharing in the internal
market as well as in AFSJ between the EU and the Member
States can only be determined by looking to the detailed
provisions, and the judicial interpretation thereof.
Member States will only lose their competence within
the regime of shared power to the extent that the Union
has exercised “its” competence. Competences which are
not transferred to the EU still remain with the Member
States. Perhaps in AFSJ the Member States fear to loose
their competences, more than in the internal market.
The magnitude of AFSJ powers at supranational level
will therefore be dependant on the way the Member States
have exercised their national competences in the area of
freedom, security and justice.
2. THE LEGAL ACTS OF THE AFSJ
The general regime of legal acts specified in the Articles
288-294 TFEU of the Lisbon Treaty applies to measures
adopted in the AFSJ. The institutions can now adopt as
legal acts: regulations, directives and decisions. These acts
are replacing the acts under Article 34 EU of the Treaty of
Nice (common positions, framework decisions, decisions,
conventions). The framework decision is the equivalent of
the Lisbon Directive, however in Article 34 EU is stated
that they will not have direct effect (see J W de Zwaan/A
J Bultena, Ruimte van Vrijheid, Veiligheid en Rechtvaardigheid,
published by SDU 2002, p 78; Jaap W de Zwaan, Flora
Goudappel, Freedom, Security and Justice in the European
Union: Implementation of the Hague Programme 2004,
Cambridge University Press; Paul Craig, The Lisbon Treaty,
Law, Politics and Treaty Reform, ch 9 - Freedom, Security and
Justice, Oxford University Press, 2010 p 340).
On the contrary in the Lisbon Treaty a legislative,
delegated or implementing Directive dealing with AFSJ can
have direct effect, provided that it satisfies the criteria for
this doctrine.
In this area clashes between the Union acts and national
constitutional provisions may be expected. The question
may rise if there is a difference of the constitutional effect
of legal acts dealing with the AFSJ or with matters of the
internal market. Do they have similarly priority or primacy
on the national legal order (constitution and laws)?
3. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF THE AFSJ
Article 67 TFEU is the main provision for the AFSJ in
the Lisbon Treaty:
(1) The Union shall constitute an area of freedom,
security and justice with respect for fundamental rights
and the different legal systems and traditions.
(2) It shall ensure the absence of border internal con-
trols and a common policy on asylum, immigration and
external border control.
(3) Combat crime, racism and xenophobia through
police and judicial cooperation and through mutual
recognition of judgments in criminal matters and
through approximation of criminal laws.
(4) The Union shall facilitate access to justice, in par-
ticular through the principle of mutual recognition of
judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil matters.
These provisions are replacing Article 61 EC and ex
Article 29 TEU from the Third Pillar which initiated many
Framework Decisions and other measures that are
interpreted in several judgments of the European Court of
Justice, before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.
In the following we selected some of the judgments, in
which the implementation of these objectives has been
discussed and comment on the differences with the Lisbon
Treaty.
4. PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
LIMITING THE EFFECT OF UN, EU AND
NATIONAL DECISIONS ON PREVENTING
AND COMBATING TERRORISM
In its judgment of September 3, 2008 on economic
sanctions on individuals pursuant to a UN Resolution, the
European Court of Justice has made it clear in joined Cases
C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P Kadi & Al Barakaat v Council of the
European Union [2008] ECR I-635 that in all circumstances
the fundamental rights of EU citizens must be respected
when adopting measures in the EU, including the rights of
fair trial and regardless of international obligations. The
judgment:
(1) Sets aside the judgments of the Court of First Instance
of the European Communities of September 21, 2005
in Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission and
Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat International
Foundation v Council and Commission.
(2) Annuls Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of May
27, 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures
directed against certain persons and entities associated
with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the
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Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No
467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and
services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban
and extending the freeze of funds and other financial
resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, in so
far as it concerns Mr Kadi and the Al Barakaat
International Foundation.
(3) Orders the effects of Regulation No 881/2002 to be
maintained, so far as concerns Mr Kadi and the Al
Barakaat International Foundation, for a period that
may not exceed three months running from the date of
delivery of this judgment.
The ECJ overruled the judgments of the Court of First
Instance (CFI) because it found a breach of fundamental
rights of the European Union. The Council Regulation
freezing Mr Kadi and Al Barakaat’s funds was annulled
because the ECJ found that the rights of the defence, in
particular the right to be heard, and the right to effective
judicial review of those rights, were not respected. The
court further concluded that the freezing of funds
constituted an unjustified restriction of Mr Kadi’s right to
property.
This judgment opens a wide range of interpretations
regarding the interplay between international law
implementing EU law and conflicting national legislation
in the AFSJ.
In this case the acts of the European Union were to be
seen as a direct implementation of Security Council
Resolution 1267 (1999). Yusuf and Kadi had argued that
the contested regulation infringed their fundamental
rights, in particular their right to the use of their property
and the right to a fair hearing, as guaranteed by Article 6 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), inasmuch as
that regulation imposed on them heavy sanctions, both civil
and criminal, although they had not first been heard or
given the opportunity to defend themselves, nor had that
act been subjected to any judicial review whatsoever. With
more particular regard to the alleged breach of the right to
a fair hearing, the applicants stressed that they were not
told why the sanctions were imposed on them.
Article 75 TFEU of the Lisbon Treaty has been designed
in order to address the legal problems that arose in the Kadi
litigation with the annulment of Council Regulation No
881/2002 over freezing of assets of natural or legal persons
in case of Counter-Terrorist Policies and Fundamental rights
and priority of Security Council Decisions. That article
grants the EU the power to adopt restrictive measures
against individuals such as freezing of funds, financial assets
or economic gains belonging to, or owned or held by natural
or legal persons, groups or non-state entities.
By including Article 75 TFEU in the Lisbon Treaty, the
Kadi case has a constitutional impact on the supranational
legal order. Kadi shows further the impact of the
development of the legal effect of decisions and resolutions
of international organisations on the EU legal order and as
a consequence also on the national legal order.
The developments in the international legal order have
also an effect on the interpretation of international treaties
in the Netherlands constitution and its priority on Dutch
laws. According to the theory of “neo-monism”, the
priority of international decisions in the Netherlands will
from now on be limited by the fundamental principles in
the Dutch constitutional and legal order, which are
identical with the principles of the infringed fundamental
rights in the Kadi case (see R A Wessel, “The Kadi Case:
Towards a More Substantive Hierarchy in International
Law?”, International Organizations Law Review 5 (2008) 323-
27. Bogdandy is referred to as follows:
“There should always be the possibility, at least in liberal
democracies, to limit, legally, the effect of a norm or an act
under international law within the domestic legal order if it
severely conflicts with constitutional principles. This
corresponds to the state of development of international law
and the sometimes debatable legitimacy of international legal
acts […]” (emphasis added) (see A von Bogdandy,
“Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate say: On the
Relationship between International and Domestic
Constitutional Law,” International Journal of Constitutional
Law, 2008, Nos 3-4, 397-413, p 400).
Our final comment and conclusion are that for acts
(regulations, directives) adopted under Articles 288-294
TFEU in the field of combating terrorism, the direct effect
will similarly as in the Kadi case be limited by fundamental
rights in the Netherlands legal order, also after the entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The court’s fundamental
rights role will also be enhanced as a result of the binding
legal status of the Charter of Fundamental rights of the
European Union, now that it has been adopted with the
Lisbon Treaty. Articles 47-49 of the Charter are relevant
when considering fundamental rights safeguards in
criminal proceedings. An exception is made for Poland and
the UK, against whom the Charter cannot be invoked.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN
DECISION-MAKING
5.1 The role of national Parliaments
The role of national Parliaments has been enhanced. For
example the provisions of Article 69 TFEU (subsidiarity
principle) and Article 70 TFEU (evaluation of Union
policies as for example monitoring Europol and Eurojust),
and the setting up within the Council of a standing
committee in Article 71, about whose activities the national
Parliaments will be informed, are a remarkable constitutional
development. In the field of judicial cooperation in civil
matters according Article 81(3) TFEU a national Parliament
can veto the adoption of a decision of the Council on issues
of family law having cross-border implications.12
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5.2 Cross-border dimension of the crime
The EU’s competence to enact measures concerning
criminal law is now specified in Article 83 TFEU:
terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking,
illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption,
counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and
organised crime. Cross border dimension of the crime is a
requirement. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty doubts as to the
EU competence over criminal procedure existed.
5.3 Protection of fundamental aspects of the
national criminal justice system
In paragraphs 3 of Articles 82 TFEU and 83 TFEU there
are identical “emergency brakes”:
“Where a member of the Council considers that a draft
directive as referred to in paragraph 2 would affect
fundamental aspects of its criminal justice system, it may
request that the draft directive be referred to the European
Council. In that case the ordinary legislative procedure shall
be suspended. The sensitivity of the area led to the invention
of the “emergency brake” (emphasis added).
5.4 Recognition of judgments and approximation of
laws in criminal matters
In the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters
(Arts 82(3) TFEU and 83(3) TFEU) it is regulated that
judicial cooperation shall be based on the principle of
mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and
shall include the approximation of laws and regulations of
the Member States in the referred areas.
The European Parliament and the Council acting in
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure shall
adopt the necessary measures.
Since the Tampere Conclusions (1999), the principle
of mutual recognition has been seen as the cornerstone
of European criminal law. The application of this
principle can only be successful if there is mutual trust
among Member States in each other’s legal systems,
which will be more easily achieved if some form of
harmonisation (of both substantive and procedural
criminal law) has taken place. The centrality of mutual
recognition is now laid down in the Lisbon Treaty. The
application of mutual recognition to the criminal sphere
has however not been unproblematic, as mutual
recognition in the criminal sphere cannot be compared
with the concept of free movement of goods in the
internal market.
In relation to police cooperation, and especially with
regard to information exchange, the fundamental rights of
individuals are threatened in two areas: data protection and
legal protection. Fundamental rights concerns in the area
of judicial cooperation relate to adopted acts on mutual
legal assistance, extradition, execution of sentences etc.
According to the principle of mutual recognition,
decisions taken in one Member State are recognised and
executed throughout the EU, based on the presumption
that all EU Member States have a sufficient system of
criminal procedure, including a sufficient level of
fundamental rights protection. It is clear that this system
presupposes mutual trust. The lack of trust among
Member States in each other’s legal systems is a bottle neck
and impediment to the further application of mutual
recognition in the field of judicial cooperation.
6. EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT IN THE
AREA OF JUDICIAL COOPERATION
The Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of
June 13, 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the
surrender procedure between Member States, OJ L 19/1,
(“EAW”) is probably the most debated and at the same
time most used instrument in the European criminal law,
providing for a simplified and fast procedure for the
surrender of suspects and convicted persons between
Member States. The number of EAWs issued has increased
from approximately 3 000 in 2004 to 13 500 in 2008. The
EAW is the first legal act to apply mutual recognition in
criminal matters.
In the preamble to the Framework Decision on the
EAW, reference to respect for human rights has been
included in Recital 12. However a (possible) violation of
human rights has not been adopted as a ground to refuse
the surrender. Another ground for refusal in pre-EAW
extradition law is the non-extradition of own nationals.
There are many interesting court cases on the
interpretation of the terms in the EAW, for example on the
grounds to refuse cooperation, double criminality
requirements, on previous crimes as in C-66/08 Kozlowski
[2008] ECR I-6041; C-123/08 Wolzenburg [2009] ECR I-
9621; C-388/08 Leymann [2008] ECR I-8993; C-303/05
Advocaten voor de Wereld VZW, [2007] ECR I-3633.
In this overview we will only focus on the questions put
forward in Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld. In 2005
three Member States’ constitutional courts (Polish,
German and Cypriot) reviewed and declared as
unconstitutional their national acts implementing the EAW
Decision. It became clear that, if national courts want, they
can block the practical operation of a third pillar measure.
The association “Advocaten voor de Wereld” brought an
action before the Belgian Arbitragehof/Cour d’Arbitrage
(Court of Arbitration), currently the Constitutional Court,
seeking the annulment of the Belgian Law transposing the
provisions of the Framework Decision of the EAW and the
surrender procedures between Member States. The
Belgian court referred to the Court of Justice for a
preliminary ruling several questions concerning the validity
of the Framework Decision.
With respect to the first claim, that the subject matter of
the EAW ought to have been regulated by means of a 13
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convention and not a framework decision, the court in its
judgment of May 3, 2007 found that (ex) Article 34 EU
does not establish any order of priority between the
different instruments listed in that provision (common
positions, framework decisions, decisions, conventions),
with the result that it cannot be ruled out that the Council
may have a choice between several instruments in order to
regulate the same subject-matter, subject to the limits
imposed by the nature of the instrument selected.
The second question concerned the infringement of the
principle of legality of criminal offences and penalties
(nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and non-discrimination.
Article 2(2) of the EAW Framework Decision contains a
list of 32 offences in respect of which the usual condition
of double criminality is dispensed with, if those offences
were punishable in the issuing state by a custodial sentence
or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three
years.
The court recalled the principle of the legality of
criminal offences and penalties which principle implies
that legislation must define clearly offences and the
penalties which they attract. That condition is met in the
case where the charged individual is in a position on the
basis of the wording of the relevant provision and with the
help of the interpretative assistance given by the courts, to
know which acts or omission will make him criminally
liable.
Finally the court in its judgment of May 3, 2007 found
no factor capable of affecting the validity of the Framework
Decision on the EAW. The observations of the Advocate
General Colomer in this case are of interest:
“79. Accordingly, the Court must break its silence and
recognise the authority of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
as an interpretative tool at the forefront of the protection of
the fundamental rights which are part of the heritage of the
Member States. That undertaking must be approached with
caution and vigour alike, in the full belief that, while the
protection of fundamental rights is an essential part of the
Community pillar, it is equally indispensable in the context of
the third pillar, which, owing to the nature of its subject-
matter, is capable of affecting the very heart of individual
freedom, the foundation of the other freedoms.
80. In that way it might be possible to avoid repeating past
misunderstandings with national courts which have been
reticent about the capacity of the Community Institutions to
protect fundamental rights. […]”
These observations are more or less implemented since
the entry into force of Article 6(1) of the TEU of Lisbon
Treaty: the Charter of Fundamental Rights shall have the
same value as the Treaties. National standards of review can
now safely be replaced by European standards, and this
protection is not less than the one offered by national
constitutions.
7. PUPINO AND THE OBLIGATION OF
CONSISTENT INTEPRETATION
In 2001 the EU has introduced the Council Framework
Decision 2001/220/JHA of March 15, 2001 on the
standing of victims in criminal proceedings, OJ 2001 L
82/1. Under Article 8 of the Framework Decision Member
States were required to ensure that where there was a need
to protect victims – particularly those most vulnerable –
from the effects of giving evidence in open court, victims
may, by decision taken by the court, be entitled to testify in
a manner which will, enable this objective to be achieved,
by any appropriate means compatible with its basic legal
principles.
The question arose before a Italian court whether the
special inquiry procedure reserved for sexual offences
should also be extended to cases of children victims as a
result of the principle of indirect effect of Third Pillar
measures. Such interpretation could be required by the
obligation to interpret national law consistently with the
framework decision.
In the Pupino case (C-105/03, Criminal Proceedings against
Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285) the ECJ held that the
obligation of “consistent interpretation” existed in the
context of the Third Pillar. The ECJ stated that this
Decision could not have direct effect. However it did not
preclude indirect effect.
Maria Pupino was a nursery school teacher. She was
accused of inflicting injuries on pupils less than five years
old. The prosecutor in the case asked the Italian court to
make use of a special inquiry procedure, by which the
children witnesses could be examined in more children-
friendly conditions. According to Italian law this was not
possible. However it became possible, thanks to the
interpretation of the Framework Decision, as the ECJ did
in Pupino.
This constitutional phenomenon of “conforming
interpretation” is the result of the Pupino decision and it
opened up EU law for further questions like the question
if EU law can be supreme (see K Lenaerts and T Cofthaut,
“Of Birds and Hedges: the Role of Primacy in invoking
Norms of EU Law” (2006) 31 EL Rev 287; J H. Reestman
and F A N J Goudappel, in De Europese Unie na het Verdrag
van Lissabon, Editors R H van Ooik and R A Wessel,
Hoofdstuk 14 Het Verdrag van Lissabon en de ruimte van
vrijheid, veiligheid en recht, p 175).
Some commentators contended that the Third Pillar was
less intergovernmental than was commonly thought.
The ECJ considered further that the principle of
“conforming interpretation” was more or less based on the
principle of loyal cooperation and therefore also applicable to
the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
The application in the Third Pillar of loyal cooperation
(based on Art 10 EC) was disputed by some intervening
parties. Since (ex) Article 10 EC was more or less replaced14
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by Article 4(3) EU of the Lisbon Treaty this will after
Lisbon not be anymore a dispute. Further would after
Lisbon an identical court judgment be expected as stating
that the “Directive” replacing the Framework Decision
could have direct effect, without the need to refer to
“consistent interpretation” or “indirect effect”.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this contribution a short analysis of the Lisbon articles
and some ECJ cases has been given. The cases deal with the
interpretation of Framework Decisions of the old Third
Pillar and their impact on the area of freedom, security and
justice on the national legal order. In these ECJ judgments
delivered before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
the protection of human rights and its principles were
already included. However, one of the most important new
constitutional developments of the Lisbon Treaty for our
topic is the entry into force of Article 6 (1) TEU, which
holds that the Charter of Fundamental Rights shall have the
same legal value as the Treaties. As a consequence many
ECJ Decisions are more or less outdated since Lisbon as
the need that was put forward in the ECJ Decisions for
more protection of human rights in the areas of police and
judicial cooperation and direct effect of Framework
Decisions are now unnecessary since reference to the
articles of the Charter will now be preferred.
The introduction of more human rights protection by
the European Court of Justice is expected, taking into
consideration the planned accession of the EU to the
European Convention on Human Rights and the binding
legal status of the Charter adopted with the Lisbon Treaty.
In the referred and discussed pre-Lisbon ECJ cases and
Opinion of Advocate General the need for protection of
human rights and for the Charter of Fundamental Rights
has been explicitly mentioned. Guaranteeing equal human
and fundamental rights protection at EU level will enhance
mutual trust among Member States.
Another important constitutional development on the
impact of AFSJ on the national legal order is the new
Lisbon provisions from Article 288-294 TFEU on the
regulations, directives and decisions. They will have more
direct effect and applicability than the respective measures
as common positions, framework decisions, decisions and
conventions from Article 34 of the EU Treaty of Nice.
Article 34 has held that framework decisions and other
decisions would have no direct effect. As in the Lisbon
Treaty direct effect is not excluded, this is an important
constitutional change.
The Acts of Article 288 TFEU can be therefore more
effective, since they can have supremacy and direct effect.
Moreover can the new infringement procedure of Articles
259 and 260 TFEU contribute to a better and more timely
implementation of EU law obligations in the Area of
Freedom, Security and Justice?
The third constitutional development concerns the fact
that the Lisbon Treaty has brought all provisions
concerning AFSJ within the “normal” “Community”
Treaty structure. As a consequence the jurisdiction of the
ECJ extends to all EU acts. The Lisbon Treaty made a
major change in regard to the limits of the preliminary
rulings procedure and legality review in the area of the
AFSJ. They will mostly be equally treated as the other
subject matters falling within Article 267 TFEU, with
exceptions in the area of police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters.
A fourth constitutional development is that the national
Parliaments have within decision-making of AFSJ a more
important role than before Lisbon, compared also with
their role in the decision-making in the internal market.
The introduction of supremacy in the First Pillar was
necessary for ensuring uniformity of application of EC law
as a condition for the establishment of the internal market
with free movement of goods, services and capital. It is
admitted that the same rationale does not apply in the
Third Pillar for the free movement of persons (see S
Prechal, “Direct Effect, Indirect Effect, Supremacy and the
Evolving Constitution of the European Union”, in C
Barnard, The Fundamentals of EU Law Revisited (Oxford
University Press 2007), 35, 41).
Does this mean as the citation of K Lenaerts suggests
that all national law conflicting with Third Pillar EU law
has to be simply set aside? Does it mean that Third Pillar
EU law is capable of overriding national constitutions? A
partial judicial answer to these questions were given in the
case C-303/05, Advocaten voor de Wereld. National standards
of review may be replaced by European standards. The
centrality of mutual recognition is now laid down in the
Lisbon Treaty. However the lack of mutual trust and lack of
procedural safeguards at EU level are weak aspects that
impact negatively on the further enhancement of police
and judicial cooperation within the EU. Also the sensitivity
of the area is an obstacle to transferring more national
powers to the European Union.
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